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自1989年以来，中国共产党将其政治统治建立在其行政管理的成功之上，特别是在经济管理方面。
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政府和普通民众之间达成了隐性的政治交易：人们将接受威权统治，作为回报，他们将享受更高的生活水平。
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到2010年代中期，这一政治基础开始出现裂痕，增长放缓，经济面临强劲的逆风。
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2019年底COVID-19大流行病的出现以及中国长期暂停 "一切照旧 "加速了这些发展。
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中国通过非常规的控制手段，设法使自己基本保持开放，但中国经济的表现似乎再次超过了几乎整个世界。
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到2022年下半年，由于严重的封锁造成了破坏性的经济损失，任何中国的特殊性都被打破了。
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长期问题继续恶化：房地产市场和地方政府财政似乎处于崩溃的边缘，出生率急剧下降，导致六十年来人口首次正式减少。
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经济成为党国的严重政治责任，他们越来越多地转向法律，以使其统治合法化。
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大流行后的反弹可能会推动经济增长在2023年回到5%以上，但在可预见的未来，中国的统治者不能再安全地依赖经济表现作为政治合法性和社会支持的主要来源。
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中国政府正在寻找经济增长之外的合法性
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习近平主席的标志性政策寻求创造新的合法性来源
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这些政策分为三类：国内政策、民族主义情绪和体制改革
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福利改革不太可能帮助足够多的人，从而大幅提高政府的合法性。
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调动民族主义情绪的成本更低，也更容易。
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中国政府利用国际和国内发展的素材，制作和传播民族主义叙事。
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近年来，民族主义已成为中国最重要的政治潮流。
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民族主义叙事是由主要的社交媒体影响者和键盘侠传播的
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民族主义叙事的例子包括香港的国家安全法，孟晚舟的拘留，零关税政策，以及南希-佩洛西对台湾的访问。
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当代版的中国民族主义主要以国家财富和权力的叙事为基础，由于庆祝中国在过去几十年中取得的物质成就而吸引了公众的想象。这使得它在国家经济表现良好时能够扩大公众对党国的支持，但在经济陷入困境时却无法作为政治合法性的后备来源发挥作用。这一点在最近几个月很明显，公众对政府政策表示不满、嘲讽和公然谴责的情况已经司空见惯。
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共产党对将中国民族主义塑造成这种注重表现的形式负有很大责任，早期对儒家思想和其他传统文化的敌视起到了很大的影响。中国政治话语与任何一套 "有机的中国 "社会政治价值观的联系仍然很薄弱，但在富裕的年头，这对增加社会支持是有好处的。然而，当经济形势变得更加严峻时，这就很危险了。
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由于大量中产阶级中国人表示希望离开中国到西方去，因此奔跑学的论述突出了当代中国民族主义特征中的这一弱点。面对这种普遍的不快，民族主义的说法变得惊人的沉默，当政府的活动没有达到他们自己的业绩预期时，一些人甚至偶尔会批评政府。
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习近平和他的副手们正在利用法律来巩固他们的合法地位
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中国法律不对党中央领导层进行法律限制，但对其他所有人进行限制
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法律可以用来控制或压迫，但也可以用来保护权利。
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近年来，中国的社会政治合法性有所上升
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反腐败运动、体制变革和提高法律遵守度的改革就是证明。
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法官、律师和地方官员接受了更多的法律培训，并在遵守法律方面接受评估。
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中国城市居民对限制个人权利的法律改革做出了积极的反应。
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对合法性的投资加强了公众对政府行为的信心
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合法性是经济业绩和福利支出的一个有意义的替代物
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Chinese Communist Party has grounded its political rule in the success of its administration, particularly in managing the economy, since 1989.
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Implicit political bargain was struck between the government and the general population: people would accept authoritarian rule, and in return, they would enjoy higher living standards.
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By mid-2010s, cracks had begun to emerge in this political foundation, with growth slowing and the economy facing strong headwinds.
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Onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in late 2019 and the prolonged suspension of “business as usual” in China accelerated these developments.
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China managed to keep itself largely open by means of extraordinary controls, but the Chinese economy once again seemed to outperform nearly the entire world.
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By second half of 2022, any sense of Chinese exceptionalism had been shattered as severe lockdowns took a devastating economic toll.
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Long-term problems continued to worsen: real estate market and local government finances appeared on the verge of collapse, and plummeting birthrates led to the first official decrease in population in six decades.
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Economy became a grave political liability for the party-state, and they are increasingly turning toward the law to legitimize their rule.
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Post-pandemic rebound might drive growth back above five percent in 2023, but for the foreseeable future, China’s rulers can no longer safely rely on economic performance as the primary source of political legitimacy and social support.
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Chinese government is looking for legitimacy beyond economic growth
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President Xi Jinping’s signature policies seek to create new sources of legitimacy
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These policies fall into three categories: domestic policy, nationalist sentiments, and institutional reforms
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Welfare reforms are unlikely to help enough people to substantially enhance the government’s legitimacy
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Mobilizing nationalist sentiments is cheaper and easier
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Chinese government produces and disseminates nationalist narratives, with material from international and domestic developments
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Nationalism has become the single most important Chinese political current in recent years
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Nationalist narratives are circulated by major social media influencers and keyboard warriors
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Examples of material for nationalist narratives include Hong Kong’s national security law, Meng Wanzhou’s detention, zero-COVID policy, and Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan
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The contemporary version of Chinese nationalism is predominantly grounded in narratives of national wealth and power, capturing the public imagination due to celebrating China’s material accomplishments over the past decades. This allows it to amplify public support for the party-state when national economic performance is high, but does not allow it to function as a backup source of political legitimacy when the economy is struggling. This has been evident in recent months, where public expressions of unhappiness, mockery, and outright condemnation of government policy have become commonplace.
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The Communist Party is largely responsible for molding Chinese nationalism into this performance-oriented form, with the early hostility to Confucianism and other traditional cultures playing a large and consequential role. This connection of Chinese political discourse to any set of “organically Chinese” sociopolitical values remains weak, but is good for additional social support in years of plenty. However, it is dangerous when the economic going gets tougher.
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The run-ology discourse has highlighted this weakness in the character of contemporary Chinese nationalism, as large numbers of middle-class Chinese have expressed their desire to leave the country for the West. Nationalist accounts have become strikingly silent in the face of this widespread unhappiness, and some have even occasionally criticized government activity when it falls short of their own performance expectations.
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Xi and his lieutenants are using the law to solidify their legitimacy
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Chinese law does not impose legal restrictions on the central party leadership, but does impose restrictions on everyone else
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Laws can be used to control or oppress, but can also be used to protect rights
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There has been a rise of sociopolitical legality in China in recent years
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The anticorruption campaign, institutional changes, and reforms to increase compliance with laws are evidence of this
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Judges, lawyers, and local officials have received more legal training and are evaluated on their compliance with the law
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Chinese urban population responds positively to legal reforms that restrict individual rights
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Investment in legality fortifies public confidence in government action
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Legality is a meaningful substitute to economic performance and welfare spending
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