在过去的三个月里，中国政府面临着一系列危机，包括公众的不满，"零COVID "措施的结束，公共卫生的紧急情况，以及经济增长下降到多年来的最低水平。
中国政府没有进入危机模式，而是在很大程度上甩开了这些挫折–没有对扭转 "动态清零 "措施作出解释，压制官方数据，并发起运动，防止夸大悲观情绪。
这一策略似乎已经奏效–国内对政府的反弹不大，许多普通中国人似乎认为健康危机不是什么大事，病毒很快就被遗忘了。
北京在COVID动态清零前后对大流行病的反应可能会对一党制国家产生长期的影响。
COVID清零战略无法阻止毁灭性的病毒潮，而突然重启后的高死亡人数又使人们对该政权保持人口健康的能力产生了新的怀疑。政府对病毒的处理清楚地表明，为了扩大其权力和控制，它愿意牺牲有效的治理甚至科学。这种夺权行为将破坏中国社会和国家之间的信任，并在下一次危机到来时给习近平带来新的挑战。
中国维持了三年的新冠清零措施，导致脑血管和心血管疾病的死亡人数增加70万。
5.3亿中国人被封锁，造成了经济和心理上的影响。
一位著名的中国心理学家报告说，抑郁症、焦虑症、自我伤害和自杀的情况有所增加。
封锁阻碍了及时的，导致其他疾病的死亡率增加。
封锁造成了社会分裂，并被视为越来越具有任意性和惩罚性。
一些居民在大流行期间被剥夺了食物和药品。
北京的COVID清零措施造成了巨大的人员伤亡。
政策的转折对公共卫生和经济产生了深远的影响。
这些措施违背了科学和常识，导致了负面的心理影响。
根据政府的官方统计，在12月8日至2月2日期间，中国医院记录的COVID-19死亡人数为82,238人。
中国疾病预防控制中心的首席流行病学家吴尊友估计，到1月21日，80%的人口已经感染了COVID-19，这可能导致100万例COVID死亡。
其他模型估计自重新开放以来有100万至150万人死亡，传闻表明真正的死亡人数可能更接近这些估计的高端。
在两个月内，中国的COVID-19死亡人数可能比美国三年内的死亡人数还多。
中国政府声称在2020-21年期间避免了95万例死亡，但与混乱的政策重启有关的死亡很可能已经抵消了这些数字。
中国花了数十亿美元维持了多年的零COVID计划，但最后却遭受了同样的健康后果，甚至更糟。
在放弃零COVID之后，感染和死亡的猖獗蔓延，在某些方面甚至更有创伤性。
病毒潮在大量人口中上演，导致许多人的健康受到破坏性影响。
它提醒我们在面对大流行病时采取快速和有效行动的重要性。
中国的COVID清零政策暴露了习近平政权的一些基本事实–加强了中国治理的非民主和非科学特征。
北京看到了一个追求几乎不受限制地监视和控制人口的机会–导致了昂贵的和侵入性的项目。
这些项目打破了天安门事件后的社会契约，牺牲了更有效的政策，如老年人的全面疫苗接种计划。
通过在近三年内限制数亿中国公民的行动和自由，习近平高估了公众的容忍度。
由于缺乏有效的反馈机制，习近平没有意识到公众的不满，直到各大城市爆发了街头抗议活动。
这些抗议活动要求结束 "新冠清零 "计划，甚至要求习近平下台。
北京突然从COVID清零政策转向鼓励病毒传播，导致病例和死亡人数爆炸性增长
政策转变破坏了人们对政府的信任
政府淡化了病毒的严重性，采取了它曾经嘲笑过的 "迁就 "做法
放弃了国家的大部分测试基础设施，要求人们对自己的健康承担 “第一责任”。
人们分享他们的症状信息并嘲笑官方数据
政府几乎耗尽了其资源和公众的善意
尽管他们以多种方式破坏了政府的公信力，但习近平的COVID失误并没有对其政权构成生存威胁。政府一直在表明它能够应对其统治所面临的深刻挑战。通过混淆视听、搪塞和误导，政府成功地将普通人的沮丧情绪从自己身上转移开来。
对于那些认为自己是体制内的人或者只能获得政府认可的信息的大部分中国人来说，他们也比较容易相信这样的说法，即国家在三年内保护了人民免受大流行病的影响。在农村地区，脆弱的卫生保健系统无法处理爆炸性增长的COVID-19病例，但在不良信息和宿命论的唆使下，农村地区度过了危机。
由于只有那些经过COVID-19检测并在医院死亡的人被正式登记为COVID死亡病例，许多人的死亡根本不算数。约瑟夫-斯大林有句名言：“一个人的死亡是一个悲剧，一百万人的死亡是一个统计数字。” 但是在中国重新开放期间，许多人的死亡甚至没有成为一个统计数字。
三年前武汉解除封锁后，政府得以宣布战胜COVID-19大流行病，这是因为对信息和权力的强大威权控制。
中国政府的极端COVID策略给国家留下了持久的伤痕，经济增长下降到1974年以来最慢的速度，公众对政府的信任也受到侵蚀。
习近平的高度集权和个人化的统治已经清楚地表明，这个国家极易受到破坏、冲击和任意决策的影响。如果没有根本性的改变，类似的灾难可能会在未来发生，造成更大的后果。
Over the past three months, the Chinese government has faced a series of crises, including public discontent, ending of “zero COVID” measures, public health emergency, and economic growth falling to its lowest level in years.
Instead of going into crisis mode, Beijing has largely shrugged off these setbacks – offering no explanation for its reversal of zero COVID, suppressing official data, and launching a campaign to prevent exaggeration of gloomy emotions.
The strategy appears to have worked – with little domestic backlash against the government, many ordinary Chinese seem to have concluded that the health crisis was not a big deal, and the virus quickly forgotten.
Beijing’s response to the pandemic before and after zero COVID could have implications for the one-party state in the long term.
The zero-COVID strategy was unable to prevent a devastating viral wave and the high death toll that followed the sudden reopening raised new doubts about the regime’s ability to keep the population healthy. The government’s handling of the virus has made clear that it is willing to sacrifice effective governance and even science in the interest of extending its power and control. This power grab will break down the trust between Chinese society and the state and create new challenges for Xi when the next crisis comes.
China maintained zero-COVID measures for three years, resulting in a 700,000 increase in deaths from cerebrovascular and cardiovascular diseases.
530 million Chinese were subject to lockdowns, resulting in economic and psychological consequences.
A leading Chinese psychologist reported an increase in depression, anxiety, self-injury, and suicide.
Lockdowns prevented timely access to health care, leading to increased mortality from other diseases.
Lockdowns caused social ruptures, and were seen as increasingly arbitrary and punitive.
Some residents were deprived of food and medicine during the pandemic.
The human toll of Beijing’s zero-COVID measures is significant.
The policy U-turn had far-reaching consequences on public health and the economy.
The measures ran contrary to science and common sense, leading to a negative psychological impact.
According to the official government tally, there were 82,238 COVID-19 deaths recorded in Chinese hospitals between December 8 and February 2.
Wu Zunyou, the chief epidemiologist of the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention, estimated that by January 21, 80 percent of the population had been infected with COVID-19, which could have resulted in 1 million COVID deaths.
Other models have estimated 1.0-1.5 million deaths since the reopening, and anecdotal evidence suggests the true death toll may have been closer to the high end of these estimates.
It is likely that there were more COVID-19 deaths in China in two months than there were in the United States over the span of three years.
The Chinese government claims to have avoided 950,000 deaths during 2020-21, but the deaths associated with the messy and chaotic policy reopening have likely canceled out these numbers.
China spent billions of dollars maintaining a zero-COVID program for years, only to suffer the same, if not worse, health consequences in the end.
The rampant spread of infection and death that followed the abandonment of zero COVID was in some ways even more traumatic.
The virus wave played out over a large population, leading to devastating health consequences for many.
It is a reminder of the importance of quick and effective action in the face of a pandemic.
China’s COVID policies have exposed some fundamental truths about Xi’s regime - strengthening nondemocratic and nonscientific features of Chinese governance.
Beijing saw an opportunity to pursue almost unchecked surveillance and control of the population - resulting in costly and invasive programs.
These programs broke the post-Tiananmen social contract, sacrificing more effective policies such as full vaccination programs for the elderly.
By restricting the movement and freedom of hundreds of millions of Chinese citizens for almost three years, Xi overestimated public tolerance.
Lacking effective feedback mechanisms, Xi failed to realize public dissatisfaction until street protests erupted across major cities.
These protests called for the zero-COVID program to end and even for Xi to step down.
Beijing abruptly shifted from zero COVID policy to encouraging viral spread, leading to an explosive rise of cases and deaths
Policy shift undermined people’s trust in government
Government downplayed severity of virus and adopted “accommodationist” approach it had once ridiculed
Abandoned much of state’s testing infrastructure and asked people to bear “first responsibility” for their own health
People shared information on their symptoms and mocked official data
Government nearly exhausted its resources and good will of the public
