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美国国家安全官员关注的是中国不断增长的军事力量，它被描述为一个 “近乎同行的竞争者”。
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这已成为美国军方为提供有效防御而需要调整的基准。
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然而，美国的国防战略似乎没有根据中国带来的挑战进行调整。
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中国的全球力量投射不仅基于他们的军事现代化，而且还基于他们的经济地位。
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他们是许多国家的最大贸易伙伴，并提供了许多实现国际贸易的关键基础设施。
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它们在海上运输方面尤为突出，在全球范围内融资、设计、建造、运营和拥有港口码头方面处于领先地位。
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这一海上网络对中国的力量投射有着至关重要的影响。
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他们没有能力像美国那样维持前沿部署的部队，而且在吉布提之后还没有建立另一个军事基地。
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相反，他们已经成为一个 “码头竞争者”，利用其海洋港口基础设施的民事和军事双重用途来支持其武装力量的影响力。
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中国公司现在拥有或经营横跨世界各主要地区的近百个商业港口的码头。这些重要的基础设施支持着解放军的全球行动，中国军舰利用这些港口进行加油、补给，甚至进行专门的维护和修理。到2022年，中国企业在世界100大集装箱港口中的36个港口拥有或经营一个或多个码头，北京的全球港口扩张是由经济和战略重点驱动的。
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中国共产党为中国企业在港口和海上运输等领域的快速扩张提供了激励和物质支持，而 "一带一路 "倡议也帮助中国企业在港口领域的发展。港口对于海军力量的投射也很有价值，中国拥有的港口经常与东道国的军事基地共处一地。
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中国人民解放军在具有战略意义的地点的持续军事存在，可能会迫使其他国家的海军改变其武力态势和常规，影响全球对中国军事能力的看法，并可能阻止其他国家挑战中国以保护其经济资产和利益。了解中国港口活动的性质和程度以及它如何为北京的利益服务是很重要的。
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目前，中国企业在各大洲和主要海域都拥有和经营港口码头，其中连接中国和主要出口市场以及从中东和非洲进口自然资源的商业海运通道上的网络最为密集。这条东西向的主要海上交通线被称为中国的 “海上生命线”，被解放军视为保护中国海外贸易利益的一项 “战略任务”。中国一半以上的海外港口项目都位于主要海上咽喉附近。
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中国政府有多种方式对中国海外公司施加影响，如国有企业和人事任命。国有企业（SOEs）对中国政府的指令反应强烈，因为国家是它们的主要股东，在某些情况下是唯一的股东。此外，中国政府已经做出明确努力，以更好地利用中国企业的商业港口网络，为中国更广泛的外交政策服务。
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中国法律还规定，如果政府下令进行军事动员，某些民用资产必须保留并提供给解放军使用。自2015年以来，中国政府进行了全面的军事改革，将民用资产和设施进一步纳入解放军的作战常规。军事指挥官被授权与运输企业直接接触，并利用其设施预先部署资源，管理专业零件、燃料和可能的弹药。中国的海外港口设施集中在少数几家中国公司手中，为这个过程提供了便利。
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中国公司必须获得港口资产的多数股权或唯一所有权，才能控制其使用方式。
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在95个有中国公司参与的海外港口中，中国公司拥有55个港口的多数或唯一所有权。
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在其中的29个港口，中国公司拥有完全的运营控制权。
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拥有运营控制权的中国公司可以优先考虑某些船只和货物，决定燃料、零件和码头设备的可用性。
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他们还可以决定整个港口群的发展，限制或排除某些船只的使用。
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这些设施可以被用来支持海军行动，而牺牲商业活动。
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中国的商业港口网络可以在广泛的地理区域内为军事行动进行协调。
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它们以合理的物质和地缘政治成本提供后勤和情报能力。
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这些港口在中国周边地区以外的战争中作用有限。
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中国已经表明，通过海外军事基地进行权力投射的传统方法并不是建立全球军事存在的唯一途径。
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中国已经证明了其从海外商业港口投射权力的能力和意愿。
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中国公司现在拥有并经营着全球范围内的大量码头，这些码头都受到党国的影响。
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中国公司在全球港口和海上运输业的扩张表明，尽管有已知的安全风险，但很少有国家愿意阻止它们。
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如果中国政府选择通过商业港口来投射高端战斗力，它将面临严峻的挑战。
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在战时或危机情况下，中国公司对非盟国管辖区的港口的控制是不安全的。
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港口是固定的目标，几乎无法保护其免受直接打击。
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如果发生冲突，东道国政府可能会暂停港口的运营，甚至采取行动扣押或国有化中国的设施。
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从商业港口投射战斗力有诸多弊端，因此解放军将继续努力建立更多专门的海外基地，以应对高端突发事件。
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中国庞大的全球商业港口网络反映并放大了其不断增长的实力。
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中国通过其港口在世界各大洋寻求更大的商业和军事优势。
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U.S. national security officials are focused on China’s growing military power, which is described as a “near-peer competitor”.
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This has become the benchmark for the U.S. military to adjust to in order to provide effective defense.
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However, U.S. defense strategy appears not to be calibrated to the challenges that China poses.
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China’s global power projection is not only based on their military modernization, but also their economic position.
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They are the largest trading partner of many countries, and provide much of the critical infrastructure that enables international trade.
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They are especially prominent in maritime transportation, leading in financing, designing, building, operating, and owning port terminals across the globe.
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This maritime network has crucial implications for China’s power projection.
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They do not have the capacity to maintain forward-deployed forces like the U.S., and have yet to establish another military base after Djibouti.
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Instead, they have become a “pier competitor”, leveraging the dual civilian-military uses of their ocean port infrastructure to buttress the reach of their armed forces.
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Chinese companies now own or operate terminals in nearly one hundred commercial ports spanning every major world region. This critical infrastructure supports the global operations of the PLA, and Chinese military vessels use these ports to refuel, resupply, and even undergo specialized maintenance and repairs. By 2022, Chinese firms owned or operated one or more terminals at 36 of the world’s top 100 container ports, and Beijing’s global port expansion is driven by both economic and strategic priorities.
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The Chinese Communist Party has offered incentives and material support for Chinese firms to expand rapidly in sectors such as ports and maritime transportation, and the Belt and Road Initiative has helped Chinese enterprises in the port sector grow. Ports are also valuable for the projection of naval power, and Chinese-owned ports are frequently co-located with host nations’ military bases.
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The PLA’s sustained military presence in strategically important locations may force other navies to alter their force postures and routines, influence global perceptions of China’s military capabilities, and potentially deter other states from challenging China to protect their economic assets and interests. It is important to understand the nature and extent of China’s port activity and how it serves Beijing’s interests.
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Chinese firms now own and operate port terminals on every continent and major ocean, with the network being densest along the commercial sea lanes connecting China to its major export markets and natural resource imports from the Middle East and Africa. This main east–west sea line of communication is referred to as China’s “maritime lifeline” and is seen as a “strategic task” by the PLA to protect China’s trade interests abroad. Well over half of China’s overseas port projects are located close to major maritime chokepoints.
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The Chinese government has multiple ways to exert influence over Chinese companies abroad, such as state ownership and personnel appointments. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are highly responsive to Beijing’s direction because the state is their primary—and in some cases sole—shareholder. Additionally, Beijing has made explicit efforts to better leverage Chinese firms’ commercial port network to serve China’s wider foreign policy.
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Chinese law also mandates that certain civilian assets be maintained and made available to the PLA if the government orders military mobilization. Since 2015, Beijing has undertaken sweeping military reforms that have further integrated civilian assets and facilities into the PLA’s operational routine. Military commanders are authorized to engage directly with transport enterprises and use their facilities to pre-position resources, manage specialized parts, fuels, and potentially munitions. Concentration of China’s overseas port facilities in a small handful of Chinese firms facilitates this process.
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Chinese firms must acquire majority stakes or sole ownership of port assets to have control over how they are used.
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Chinese firms have majority or sole ownership of 55 of 95 overseas ports with Chinese company involvement.
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In 29 of these ports, Chinese firms have full operational control.
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Chinese firms with operational control can prioritize certain vessels and cargos and determine availability of fuels, parts, and pier-side equipment.
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They can also determine the development of the port complex as a whole and limit or exclude certain vessels from its use.
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These facilities can be used to support naval operations at the expense of commercial activity.
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Chinese commercial port networks can coordinate for military operations across a broad geographic area.
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They provide logistics and intelligence capabilities at a reasonable material and geopolitical cost.
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These ports are of limited use in wars outside of China’s immediate periphery.
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China has demonstrated that traditional methods of power projection through overseas military bases is not the only pathway to establishing a global military presence.
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Beijing has demonstrated its capability and willingness to project power from overseas commercial ports.
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Chinese companies now own and operate a vast portfolio of terminals worldwide which are subject to party-state influence.
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Expansion of Chinese firms in the global ports and maritime transportation industry shows few countries have been willing to block them, despite known security risks.
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Should Beijing elect to project high-end combat power through commercial ports, it will face stiff headwinds.
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Chinese companies’ control over ports in nonallied foreign jurisdictions is not secure under wartime or crisis conditions.
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Ports are fixed targets and have little protection from directed strikes.
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A host government might suspend port operations or even move to seize or nationalize Chinese facilities if conflict broke out.
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There are myriad drawbacks to projecting combat power from commercial ports, so the PLA will continue efforts to establish more dedicated overseas bases to meet high-end contingencies.
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China’s expansive global network of commercial ports reflects and amplifies its growing power.
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China seeks greater commercial and military advantage across the world’s oceans through its ports.