观点:在吉布提,中国的外太空梦是一场法律噩梦|外交政策

  • 香港航天科技集团与吉布提签署协议,在奥博克建设火箭发射设施

  • 如果建成,这将是第一个由中国或中国私营公司在外国领土上资助的发射设施。

  • 在外国领土上建设一个太空港是很复杂的,可能会停滞不前或遭到破坏。

  • 符合北京在非洲大陆投射力量的更广泛努力

  • 提供投资、创造就业机会和经济增长的潜力

  • 在非洲之角的单一发射设施的战略效用有限

  • 中国可能利用伙伴关系作为机会,使一个潜在的无赖行为者成为可能,并重塑全球预期

  • 如果在世界其他地区使用,美国和志同道合的国家可能无法纠正这种情况

  • 在过去十年中,中国国家主导的和商业的进入外层空间的需求激增,但可行的发射设施的供应却没有跟上。

  • 北京已经扩大了国内的发射设施和选择,现在商业实体寻求在这个网络中增加外国节点。

  • 奥博克的一个太空港可能对中国有吸引力,因为靠近赤道的发射更省燃料。

  • 这项投资不会提供明显的战略价值,但会给中国一个舞台来展示其对国际空间法的另一种解释。

  • 作为大多数与空间有关的主要国际法律文书的缔约国,中国必须遵守对其行为的某些限制。

  • 然而,吉布提目前没有任何这些法律义务的负担。

  • 这为希望模糊遵守界限的国家提供了一个方便的开口。

  • 中国可能有兴趣利用非缔约国领土上的一个太空港来回避或拒绝它不想遵守的规则。

  • 启用一个潜在的无赖行为者的后果可能会像滚雪球一样失去控制。

  • 根据其最初的备忘录,香港航天科技集团表示它将在30年后将奥博克太空港转让给吉布提政府。

  • 这将加剧对轨道上可能出现的不当行为的担忧,因为吉布提将不承担授权和监督其境内空间活动的法律责任。

  • 中国可能会寻求在其他具有类似吸引力的地理环境和有限政治义务的国家扩大其空间站网络。

  • Hong Kong Aerospace Technology Group signed agreement with Djibouti to build a rocket launch facility in Obock

  • If completed, it would be the first instance of a launch facility funded by China or a private Chinese company in foreign territory

  • Building a spaceport on foreign soil is complicated and may be stalled or scuppered

  • Fits into Beijing’s broader efforts to project power on African continent

  • Offers potential for investment, job creation, and economic growth

  • Limited strategic utility of single launch facility in Horn of Africa

  • China may use partnership as opportunity to enable a potentially rogue actor and reshape global expectations

  • US and likeminded states may not be able to rectify the situation if it is used in other parts of the world

  • Over the past decade, Chinese state-led and commercial demand for access to outer space has surged, but the supply of viable launch facilities has not kept up.

  • Beijing has expanded launch facilities and options at home, and now commercial entities seek to add foreign nodes to this network.

  • A spaceport in Obock may be attractive to China because launches close to the equator are more fuel-efficient.

  • The investment would not provide obvious strategic value, but would give China a stage to present its alternative interpretations of international space law.

  • As a party to most of the major space-relevant international legal instruments, China must abide by certain limitations on its behavior.

  • However, Djibouti is currently unburdened by any of these legal obligations.

  • This provides a convenient opening for states hoping to blur the lines of compliance.

  • China may be interested in using a spaceport in nonparty territory to sidestep or reject rules it does not want to follow.

  • The consequences of enabling a potentially rogue actor could snowball out of control.

  • Under its original memorandum, the Hong Kong Aerospace Technology Group indicated it would transfer the Obock spaceport to the Djiboutian government after 30 years.

  • This would exacerbate concerns about the potential for misconduct in orbit, as Djibouti would bear no legal responsibility to authorize and supervise space activities in its territory.

  • China may seek to expand its network of spaceports in other countries with similarly attractive geographies and limited political obligations.