經濟學人提出一個慨念:亞洲替代方案

These countries could lure manufacturing away from China

Call them “Altasia”

Mar 3rd 2023

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Alot of new portmanteaus have appeared in the pages of The Economist in recent years, many of them referring to phenomena in business and economics. Readers (and correspondents) have acquainted themselves with Bidenomics, permacrisis and DeFi. This week we came up with a new one: Altasia.

Short for the alternative Asian supply chain, Altasia is a result of the widening geopolitical rift between America and China. This is forcing global manufacturers to look elsewhere in Asia for new production sites. No single country in the region comes close to matching China’s importance as an export hub. But a crescent of 14 countries are together beginning to provide competition (see map).

How does Altasia compare with China? In exports they are evenly matched. Altasia shipped $634bn in merchandise to America in the 12 months to September 2022, a smidgen more than China’s $614bn. But China’s exports are more heavily weighted towards electronics, a vital category in which Altasia’s exporters do not all excel.

In terms of skilled workers, the two are also close. Altasia is home to 155m people aged 25 to 54—widely considered to be the prime working-age population—with a tertiary education. China has 145m.

The World Bank’s latest logistics-performance index from 2018, which measures countries on their efficiency in areas like customs, transport infrastructure and logistics regulation, shows the range of abilities across the region. China, with a score of 3.61 out of five, is ranked 27th among the 160 countries assessed. The Altasia nations range from Japan and Singapore, both in the global top ten with scores of 4.03 and 4.00 respectively, to 2.58 for Bangladesh and Cambodia, both in the lower half of the global rankings.

The great-power spat across the Pacific is not the only thing causing the shift. Labour costs in China have surged with the country’s increasing prosperity, and are now far higher than those in parts of South and South-East Asia (though workers in Altasia’s wealthiest countries, such as Singapore and Japan, earn far more). Manufacturing labour costs were $8.31 per hour in China last year, compared with less than $3 in places such as India, Thailand and Vietnam. Some manufacturers of lower-cost and lower-margin electronic goods were moving out of China even before the rift between China and America made it necessary.

Chinese production capabilities will be tough to replicate, however. The diverse economies of Altasia do not work together as a single entity the way China does. Infrastructure and logistics are huge challenges, though a number of trade pacts are easing regulatory barriers. But for many companies finding an alternative to China is now a priority. They are likely to be exploring opportunities in Altasia for years to come. ■

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14个潜在替代中国的国家其实很多不太可能。因为在中国发展之前,东南亚国家已经经历过多次资本变迁。最先是韩战美国资本涌入,后来是日本崛起,然后是亚洲四小龙。中国的有些产业就是从东南亚迁过来的,现在再返回东南亚可能性很小。这样说吧,东南亚曾经富裕过,而且比中国要先富很久。

我做了一条线,东边的国家地区都不可能,比如日本、韩国、台湾、新加坡、菲律宾、马来西亚、印度尼西亚。因为原始动力的美元资本就是自东向西一浪一浪向西推进的。

画线以西的国家更有希望承接中国的产业,比如,越南、老挝、泰国、柬埔寨、缅甸、印度、巴基斯坦、孟加拉。印度居首位,其次是缅甸、巴基斯坦和孟加拉,他们的国土面积之和是471万平方公里。

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这些国家有两个特点:

  1. 离中国太近:同质化竞争胜过互补性合作
  2. 离文明太远:国内政治太不稳定,基本文明体系没有建立。

从来没人说过是马上替代,全部替代。如果中国人的收入持续提高,毫无疑问会持续拉高中国产品的价格,继续把产业链放在中国,发达国家的通胀不得爆表。无论你说中国什么什么优势,东南亚又哪里哪里不行,只要中国人力成本持续上升,转移是必须的,东南亚就是再不行也有必须行的一天。

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”离中国太近“应该是中性词,离太近会有竞争,但离太近才好转移。
至于文明,印度是说英语的,接欧美的订单应该更容易。印度、巴基斯坦和孟加拉都是民选政府,只有缅甸的政局不稳定,离文明太远有点偏颇。

反过来想,当初没有美日贸易战,产业也不会转移到韩国和台湾,没有亚洲金融风暴,产业也不会转移到中国大陆。如同水的流动,资本总会去成本低廉、价值低洼的地方。

当时资本来中国的逻辑,就是现在资本要离开中国的逻辑,天下没有不散的宴席。当然,这里说的是替代不是取代,产业不会全部转移到南亚,有些产业会保留在中国,但保留在中国的产业部分也会转移到内陆,不一定都在沿海。