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中国117大厦是位于天津的世界第六高的摩天大楼，但它仍未完工。
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其他废弃的塔楼围绕着它，形成一个中央商业区的墓地。
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地方官员一直在积累债务，以建设基础设施和提高国家的GDP，这已经达到了非常高的水平。
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借款往往放在地方政府的融资工具中，以规避限制其借款能力的规则。
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新冠动态清零政策和房地产危机损害了消费，削减了工厂的产出，并迫使各省市在检测和检疫设施上花费资金。
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地方政府已经进入成本更高和更阴暗的市场角落来支付债务，现在正在寻求非正式的借款渠道和发行美元债券。
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许多地方政府不能再在中国国内市场发行债券或为到期的债券再融资。
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在2022年的最后三个月，债券的支付额超过了从新发行的资金。
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这些债务的利息比债券市场上的利息高得多，偿还期限也短得多。
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报告估计，在接受调查的319个地方政府中，有109个正在努力支付债务利息，利息占到支出的10%或以上。
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天津是成为启动市场恐慌的违约的主要候选人，自2019年以来，已有170万人离开该市。
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惨淡的土地销售收入只能覆盖该市约20%的短期借贷负债。
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在整个中国，地方预算的压力正在显现。
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由于缺乏政府财政支持，私营巴士公司暂停服务，削减医疗福利导致大连和武汉等城市发生抗议。
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地方政府正在努力向私营企业支付与毒品有关的账单，并且没有向农民工支付工资。
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较高的债务率有了危机的雏形。
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地方预算的压力正在导致抗议和暂停服务。
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地方政府正在努力支付与covid有关的账单和移民工人的费用。
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地方政府已开始出售资产以避免违约
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证券交易所的规则正在放宽，允许地方政府通过上市筹集资金
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私人交易也被用来交换资产
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目前还不清楚官员们愿意走多远，或者谁会购买这些资产
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中央政府已向地方大规模地转移资金
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地方银行同意降低利率，推迟支付本金，并延长债务期限
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这表明了偿还债务的意愿，并承认这比预期的时间要长。
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越来越多的债务表明许多项目将永远不会赢利
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自2016年以来，遵义市陷入困境的LGFV的现金流为负数
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未来十年3%的增长可能会使支付进一步复杂化
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China 117 Tower is the world’s sixth-tallest skyscraper located in Tianjin, but it remains unfinished.
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Other derelict towers surround it, forming a graveyard of a central business district.
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Local officials have been accumulating debts to build infrastructure and boost the country’s gdp, which have reached extraordinary levels.
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Borrowing often sits in local-government-financing vehicles to dodge rules which restrict their ability to borrow.
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The zero-covid policy and a property crisis have hurt consumption, cut factory output and forced cities and provinces to spend money on testing and quarantine facilities.
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Local governments have entered costlier and murkier corners of the market to make payments on debts, and are now looking to informal channels of borrowing and issuing dollar-denominated bonds.
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Many lgfvs can no longer issue bonds in China’s domestic market or refinance maturing ones.
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Payouts on bonds exceeded money brought in from new issuances in the final three months of 2022.
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Interest on these debts is much higher and repayment terms shorter than those in the bond market.
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Report estimates that 109 local governments out of 319 surveyed are struggling to pay interest on debts, with interest accounting for 10% or more of spending.
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Tianjin is a leading candidate to be the default that kicks off a market panic, with 1.7 million people having left the city since 2019.
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Dismal income from land sales can only cover about 20% of the city’s short-term lgfv liabilities.
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Across China, pressure on local budgets is being felt.
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Private bus companies suspending services due to lack of government financial support, and cuts to health-care benefits leading to protests in cities including Dalian and Wuhan.
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Local governments struggling to pay private firms for covid-related bills and failing to pay migrant workers.
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Higher rates of debt have the makings of a crisis.
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Pressure on local budgets is leading to protests and suspensions of services.
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Local governments are struggling to pay for covid-related bills and migrant workers.
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Local governments have started to sell assets to avoid defaults
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Rules on stock exchanges are being loosened to allow localities to raise capital through listings
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Private transactions are also being used to hock assets
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It is unclear how far officials are willing to go or who will buy the assets
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Central government has transferred funds to localities on a larger scale
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Local banks are agreeing to lower interest rates, defer principal payments, and extend debt maturity
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This indicates willingness to pay debts and acknowledgement that it will take longer than expected
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Growing debt suggests many projects will never become profitable
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Negative cash flows since 2016 for troubled LGFV in Zunyi
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Future decade growth of 3% could further complicate payments
链接：China’s cities are on the verge of a debt crisis | The Economist