自 "一带一路 "倡议宣布以来的十年间，非洲、亚洲和拉丁美洲的几十个新兴经济体在中国看似无限的金融力量的推动下，纷纷接受了该倡议。
这让华盛顿和它的民主伙伴们大吃一惊，促使他们担心中国政府让各国背上无法负担的债务，并在财政上支持独裁主义的朋友。
由于国内经济困境、海外投资法规的重新调整以及厄瓜多尔和斯里兰卡等国的BRI失败，中国的海外基础设施贷款现在只剩下五年前的一小部分。
北京并没有放弃BRI，但今天它是一个不那么华丽、不那么昂贵的接触模式，其前提是在贸易、电信、绿色能源和学术界等领域培养联系。
鉴于中国越来越不可能签署资助大型基础设施项目的协议，全球南方国家的领导人在向中国寻求新的融资时应谨慎行事。
美国及其工业化伙伴将需要与中国的影响模式相抗衡，该模式正在远离基础设施大型项目，并解决北京借贷狂欢的遗留问题。
美国及其工业化伙伴必须修改其发展战略，以满足对基础设施和民主问责制的要求，同时也要帮助发展中世界应对中国改造后的做法。
中国正在从错误中学习，其修改后的BRI将对那些寻求应对其经济影响力和加深民主倒退的力量的国家构成新的挑战。
美国及其合作伙伴必须采取积极主动的态度，确保中国的影响力不会破坏发展中世界在民主和经济稳定方面的进步。
一带一路倡议最初被誉为 "转型 "和 “改变游戏规则”。中国的国际贷款是美国支出的两倍多，在2016年达到1200亿美元的高峰。这一倡议针对的是发展中国家对大规模交通和能源基础设施的真正和迫切需求，提供无条件的贷款。
然而，专制主义倾向的领导人利用金砖倡议资助基础设施项目，并作为反民主冲动的财政支持。例如，中国在2016年向马来西亚总理纳吉布-拉扎克提供援助，帮助他监视批评者。这似乎让世界各地的潜在独裁者胆战心惊，正如在萨尔瓦多和所罗门群岛看到的那样。
主要启示。一带一路 "倡议最初被视为改变游戏规则，为发展中国家提供无条件的贷款。然而，在马来西亚、萨尔瓦多和所罗门群岛等国，它被用来资助倾向于独裁的领导人，鼓励反民主的冲动。
根据波士顿大学全球发展政策中心的数据，从2016年到2019年，中国的主权贷款承诺下降了94%，从750亿美元下降到只有39亿美元。
2020年和2021年的部分信息表明，COVID-19大流行病可能使中国的贷款进一步缩减。
贷款的减少是由于来自中国内部和外部的复杂的相互加强的因素，使得中国政府不太可能在短期内寻求恢复BRI基础设施贷款的以前的规模。
金砖倡议的大规模贷款项目下滑的部分原因是其自身的失败，例如向斯里兰卡提供15亿美元的贷款，用于建设一个基本空白的港口和机场。
受 "金砖 "项目影响的国家领导人对进一步的贷款持谨慎态度，导致对中国投资举措的热情下降。
中国本身的其他政治和经济因素在推动贷款放缓方面的作用要大得多。
在2016-17年，中国的经济监管机构全面修订了大型海外投资和贷款项目的规则，以减少海外大型项目的数量和规模。
这样做是为了稳定中国的宏观经济，以及打击非法资本外逃和浪费性支出。
监管改革是成功的，导致此后几年的大型贷款项目大大减少。
中国国内经济形势的恶化也表明，恢复几乎无限制的海外贷款的现状似乎不太可能。
习近平在2021年底对非洲领导人的主题演讲中表明了这一点，他在演讲中甚至一次都没有使用 "基础设施 "一词。
北京正在调整 "一带一路 "倡议的方向，从基础设施大项目转向与发展中经济体进行更多轻资本和有机形式的经济合作。
北京已将 "一带一路 "倡议转变为包括学术界、电信、绿色能源、甚至金枪鱼捕捞等领域的不那么炫目、不那么昂贵的举措。
中国正在继续努力赢得世界各地低收入国家的政治和经济效忠，但正在以一种更便宜和更灵活的方式这样做。
中国从基础设施方面的退步给了美国及其盟友一个向前迈进的机会，为贷款提供更多的问责和更清晰的基准。
美国及其伙伴必须投资于一个共同的方法，与努力保持与中国关系健康发展的国家建立联系，例如通过促进贸易和商业，支持新闻和学术交流，以及提供奖学金和技术培训。
美国及其伙伴必须花费更多精力与较小的国家建立关系，以便美国能够展示支持发展中国家的物质和民主基础设施的共同愿望。
美国及其合作伙伴应在发展的同时促进民主，以确保长期进展。美国国际开发署已经采取措施，强调健康的民主机构的重要性。然而，一些民主国家和援助国对公开接受民主化的概念犹豫不决。
一个从加拿大到日本的民主国家联盟来促进民主，将比美国一个国家更难被忽视。政策制定者应该认识到中国不断变化的国际战略，并重新配置自己的方法来对抗它。
中国正在学习，改变其他社会是一个困难的过程，会产生破坏性的影响。美国及其民主伙伴有责任针对北京的战略制定答案，并使之有效。
In the decade since the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was announced, dozens of emerging economies in Africa, Asia, and Latin America have embraced it, driven by China’s seemingly limitless financial firepower.
This caught Washington and its democratic partners by surprise, prompting concern that Beijing was saddling countries with unaffordable debt and financially backstopping authoritarian friends.
China’s overseas infrastructure lending is now a fraction of what it was five years ago, due to domestic economic woes, retooling of regulations for overseas investment, and BRI failures in countries such as Ecuador and Sri Lanka.
Beijing is not giving up on BRI, but today it is a less flashy, less expensive model of engagement predicated on cultivating ties in fields such as trade, telecommunications, green energy, and academia.
Leaders across the global South should exercise caution when seeking new financing from China, given its increasingly unlikely to sign on to fund big infrastructure projects.
The US and its industrialized partners will need to contend with a paradigm of Chinese influence that is moving away from infrastructure megaprojects and address the legacy of Beijing’s lending spree.
The US and its industrialized partners must revise their development strategy to meet demands for infrastructure and democratic accountability, while also helping the developing world cope with China’s revamped approach.
China is learning from its mistakes and its revamped BRI will pose new challenges to those seeking to respond to its economic reach and power to deepen democratic backsliding.
The US and its partners must take a proactive approach to ensure that China’s influence does not undermine the developing world’s progress towards democracy and economic stability.
The Belt and Road Initiative was initially hailed as “transformative” and “game-changing”. Chinese international lending was more than double the U.S. expenditures, peaking at $120 billion in 2016. This initiative targeted a genuine and pressing need for large-scale transport and energy infrastructure in developing countries, offering no-strings-attached loans.
However, authoritarian-leaning leaders have used the BRI to fund infrastructure projects and as a financial backstop for antidemocratic impulses. For example, China offered Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak assistance in spying on critics in 2016. This appears to have emboldened would-be authoritarians around the world, as seen in El Salvador and the Solomon Islands.
Key Takeaways: The Belt and Road Initiative was initially seen as a game-changer and offered no-strings-attached loans to developing countries. However, it has been used to fund authoritarian-leaning leaders and encourage antidemocratic impulses in countries like Malaysia, El Salvador, and the Solomon Islands.
According to Boston University’s Global Development Policy Center, China’s sovereign lending commitments dropped by 94 percent from 2016 to 2019, from $75 billion to only $3.9 billion.
Partial information from 2020 and 2021 suggests that the COVID-19 pandemic may have pared down China’s lending even further.
This decline in lending is due to a complex mix of mutually reinforcing factors from both inside and outside China, making it unlikely that Beijing will seek to revive BRI infrastructure lending at its previous scale anytime soon.
The BRI’s large-scale lending program has slumped partly due to its own failures, such as a $1.5 billion loan to Sri Lanka for a largely empty port and airport.
Leaders of countries affected by the BRI’s boondoggle projects are wary of further loans, leading to a decline in enthusiasm for Chinese investment initiatives.
Other political and economic factors in China itself have had a far bigger role in driving the slowdown in lending.
In 2016-17, China’s economic regulators overhauled the rules governing large overseas investment and lending projects to reduce the number and size of overseas megaprojects.
This was done to stabilize China’s macroeconomic stability, as well as to combat illicit capital flight and wasteful spending.
The regulatory overhaul has been successful, leading to far fewer large-scale lending projects in the years since.
China’s deteriorating domestic economic situation also suggests that a return to the status quo ante of almost unlimited overseas lending seems unlikely.
This was indicated by Xi in a keynote address to African leaders in late 2021, in which he didn’t use the word “infrastructure” even once.
Beijing is reorienting the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) away from infrastructure megaprojects and towards more capital-light and organic forms of economic collaboration with developing economies.
Beijing has shifted the BRI to encompass less flashy and less expensive initiatives in fields such as academia, telecommunications, green energy, and even tuna fishing.
China is continuing to try to win the political and economic allegiance of low-income countries around the world, but is doing so in a cheaper and more flexible way.
China’s step back from infrastructure has given the U.S. and its allies a chance to step forward, offering more accountable and clearer benchmarking for lending.
The U.S. and its partners must invest in a shared approach to build ties with countries struggling to keep relations with China on a healthy footing, such as through promoting trade and business, supporting journalism and academic exchanges, and providing scholarships and technical training.
The U.S. and its partners must expend more effort on building relationships with smaller countries, so that the U.S. can demonstrate a shared desire to support developing countries’ physical and democratic infrastructure.
The United States and its partners should promote democracy alongside development to ensure long-term progress. USAID has already taken steps to emphasize the importance of healthy democratic institutions. However, some democracies and aid donors are hesitant to openly embrace the concept of democratization.
A coalition of democracies stretching from Canada to Japan promoting democracy would be harder to ignore than the United States alone. Policymakers should recognize China’s changing international strategy and reconfigure their own approach to combat it.
China is learning that changing other societies is a difficult process which can have damaging effects. It is up to the United States and its democratic partners to develop answers to Beijing’s strategy and make them effective.